Torts—Negligence—Attractive Nuisance Doctrine by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 22 Issue 1 
December 1936 
Torts—Negligence—Attractive Nuisance Doctrine 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Torts—Negligence—Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 141 (1936). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss1/17 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Although cases of this sort are primarily concerned with negligent inter-
vening third parties, they incidentally bear on the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff. For if the plaintiff has been negligent in securing a capable
physician he is prevented from recovering.
The majority rule, therefore, is that where the second injury is caused
in part by the negligence or imprudence of the plaintiff there can be no
recovery for the second injury. Where there has been no negligence or im-
prudence recovery may be had. But the question as to what is negligence
or imprudence still exists, and must be determined by the facts in each case.
In the principal case the plaintiff was definitely imprudent. In the case of
Conner v. City of NevadaU4 two thoughtful persons might have reached dif-
ferent conclusions as to the prudence of the plaintiff. While in the typical
crutch case there is little question that, assuming careful manipulation,
the use of crutches is not negligence.
By way of caution it should be added that where the first injury has
healed as much as it is going to heal, but has left a permanent affliction,
such as a short leg, a subsequent injury resulting in part from the first
injury is independent of the first and no damages can be obtained from the
first tort feasor."5 As for example, where a person with a game leg caused
by the negligence of the first wrong-doer cannot recover from that person
for a subsequent injury by being struck by an automobile because of an in-
ability to dodge quickly.
B. W. T.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-ATTRACTIVE NuIsANcE DOCTRINE--[Tennessee].
The defendant company owned a town with a drainage culvert and a
connecting drainage ditch. During an "unusually heavy rain" the plain-
tiff's young child, playing near the drainage ditch, stepped off the side, was
drawn in by the suction near the mouth of the culvert, and was drowned.
Plaintiff maintains that defendant's drainage system at this place was "in-
adequate, insufficient, unfit and unsafe" and that the construction of the
culvert was especially dangerous and attractive to young children. Held;
even if this were a case of attractive nuisance the defendant would not be
liable under the doctrine if the object was of such a character that it would
be impractical to guard against it.,
This case is in line with the rule adhered to in all jurisdictions following
the attractive nuisance doctrine, namely, that if the practicability of the
object would be destroyed by the precautions which would be necessary to
prevent injury to children attracted by it, the defendant will be relieved of
liability.2 The widely quoted case of Peters v. Bowman sums up very clearly
14. Supra, note 9.
15. Powers v. Kansas City, 18 S. W. (2d) 545 (Mo., 1929; Croak v. Croak
33 S. W. (2d) 998 (Mo., 1931) ; but see See. 460 Restatement, Torts (appar-
ently in conflict).
1. McCay v. Du Pont Rayon Co., 96 S. W. (2d) 177 (Tenn., 1936).
2. Missouri has so held in a number of cases. Carey et al. v. Kansas
City, 187 Mo. 715, 86 S. W. 438 (1905) (reservoir in park); Overholt v.
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the position of these courts.3 These same courts, however, have taken two
very different views of the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine 4
thus causing great confusion as to the proper use of the defense of imprac-
ticability in attractive nuisance cases. The older, traditional view has held
that if the child was attracted to the object which harmed him only after
he had first trespassed on the land, there can be no recovery.5 It is submitted
Vieths, 93 Mo. 422, 6 S. W. 74 (1887) (pool in an abandoned quarry) cit-
ing and following Klix v. Nieman, 68 Wis. 271, 32 N. W. 223 (1887); Bar-
ney v. The H. and St. J. Ry Co., 126 Mo. 372, 28 S. W. 1069 (1894) (rail-
road cars in motion). Some of the other Missouri cases seemingly decided
on impracticability are Buddy v. Union Terminal Ry. Co., 276 Mo. 277, 207
S. W. 821 (1918); Compton v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 147 Mo. App. 414, 126
S. W. 821 (1910); Kelly v. Benas, 217 Mo. 1, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 903, 116
S. W. 557 (1909).
See also 45 C. J. Negligence (1928) 769, sec. 169; 20 R. C. L. Negli-
gence (1918) 88, see. 78. Kansas and Oklahoma are among this group.
Wilson v. Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. Co., 66 Kan. 183, 71 Pac. 282 (1903) ;
Somerfield v. Land and Power Co., 93 Kan. 72, 145 Pac. 893 (1915); and
Pennington v. Little Pirate Oil and Gas Co., 106 Kan. 569, 189 Pac. 137(1920), in which the Kansas courts say that they do not wish to extend
the attractive nuisance doctrine; Altus v. Millikin, 98 Okla. 1, 223 Pac. 851
(1924).
See also 36 A. L. R. 34-extended annotation; 53 A. L. R. 1336, 1344;
60 A. L. R. 1427, 1428. Some jurisdictions do not recognize the attractive
nuisance doctrine at all: Savannah, F. and W. R. Co. v. Beavers, 113 Ga.
398, 39 S. E. 82 (1901) ; Kidder v. Sadler, 117 Me. 194, 103 Atl. 159 (1918) ;
State v. Machen, 164 Md. 579, 165 Atl. 695 (1933); Ryan v. Tower, 128
Mich. 463, 87 N. W. 644 (1901) ; Frost v. Eastern R. R. 64 N. H. 220, 9 Atl.
790 (1887); Hochstein v. Congregation Talmud Torah Sons, etc., 144 Misc.
Rep. 207, 258 N. Y. S. 479 (1932); Filer v. McNair, 158 Va. 88, 163 S. E.
335 (1932).
8. Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 P. 113 (1896, 1897). The follow-
ing quotation from this case appears in a large number of cases holding
that impracticability of guarding against the child's injury may be allowed
as a defense but should not be carried to extremes: "Are we to hold that
every owner of a pond or reservoir is liable in damages for any child that
comes uninvited upon his premises and happens to fall into the water and
drown? If so, then upon the same principle must the owner of a fruit tree
be held liable for the death or injury of a child who, attracted by the fruit,
climbs into the branches and falls out. But this . . . is an absurdity ...
The owner of a thing dangerous and attractive to children is not always
and universally liable for an injury to a child tempted by the attraction.
His liability bears a relation to the character of the thing, whether natural
or common, or artificial and uncommon; to the comparative ease or diffi-
culty of preventing the danger without destroying or impairing the useful-
ness of the thing; and, in short, to the reasonableness and propriety of his
own conduct, in view of all surrounding circumstances and conditions." For
another widely quoted ease employing very similar and very striking lan-
guage see Ritz v. Wheeling, 45 W. Va. 262, 43 L. R. A. 148, 31 S. E. 993
(1898). Accord, City of Memphis v. Trice, 13 Tenn. App. 607 (1931), citing
at p. 616 Peters v. Bowman; Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Pa. St. 144 (1882)
in which the language of the holding is almost exactly like that of Peters
v. Bowman; Loftus v. Dehail et al., 133 Cal. 217, 65 Pac. 379 (1901) em-
ploying language very similar to that of Peters v. Bowman.
4. Harper, On Torts (1933) see. 93.
5. United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 66 L. ed. 615, 42
Sup. Ct. 299, 36 A. L. R. 28, Bohlen, Cases on Torts (3d ed.), 387 (1921).
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that under this view the attractive nuisance doctrine should be used merely
to determine the status of the child (trespasser or licensee). The element
of his youth should then leave the picture, except as it may be one factor
in determining the standard of care to be applied to a child.6 Thus under
this view, as the age of the child is relatively unimportant, the ordinary tort
standards of duty of care towards licensees should be applied. Impractica-
bility of guarding against injury should therefore be used as a defense
only as it would be used in any case involving licensees, and not as a special
defense viewed in the light of a child's natural curiosity.
The newer and more modern view of attractive nuisance cases has held
that regardless of whether or not the child is a trespasser on the land, if
the possessor of the land might reasonably have anticipated that the child
would trespass and thereafter be attracted by the object, there is the duty
of using reasonable care to protect such child.7 As the status of the child
is of no importance here, his youth is a vital factor in determining what
degree of care should have been exercised by the defendant. Therefore prac-
ticability is a proper defense, as more adequate safeguards against a child's
curiosity are needed than those required to safeguard against injury to
adults. Tennessee is in line with this more modern view.8
E. M. F.
6. "Infant plaintiffs are not held to that degree of care demanded of
adult plaintiffs, as a condition to recovery from a negligent defendant."
Harper, On Torts (1933) sec. 141 and cases cited therein.
7. Restatement, Torts (1934) sec. 339; Harper, On Torts (1933) sec. 93;
Arkansas Power and Light Co. v. Kilpatrick, 185 Ark. 678, 49 S. W. (2d)
353 (1932).
8. In Tenn. it is held that the fact that a child was trespassing when
it was injured does not preclude recovery. See Whirley v. Whiteman, 1
Read, 610 (1858) (exposed cogwheels); East Tenn. & W. N. C. R. Co. v.
Cargille, 105 Tenn. 628, 59 S. W. 141, 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 200 (1900) (turn-
table).
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